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IN

TH~

SUPRE~E

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
)
H. SNYDER,
:
Plelntlff end Respondent, )

~ERT~UOE

,
,
a
I

vs.

Case No. 9936

I
ROBERT JAMES CLUNE end
ROY M. ~TOKES,
Oaendants and Appel I ants. )

RESPONDENT'S

BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KINO OF CASE
This Is en action for personol Injuries al~ged
to heve been received in an automobile accident
one public highway In Utah County, Utah.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Oefendents moved the lower court to dismiss
the action on the grounds thet the Complaint of
plelntiff was barred by the Statute of Limitet~n~
Tht lower court denied the motion. Appeltcnts
then petitioned this court for en Intermediate
apptel which was granted.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants ask that the Order of the lower
:ourt denying thar motion to dismiss be reversed
snd thet the action be dismissed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The
record
lng on
1.

following facts are ~pperent from the
or were agreed to by counsel 8t the heereppellents• motion to di$miss.
This Is an action for person81 Injuries
~lleged to h8ve occurred Jn an automobile accident on e pub I Jc highway In Utah County, U~ah,
on December 14, 1958.
2. Defendants and Appel Ients are not residents of the State of Utah, but resfde in the

State of Call fornia, end as far _is known have not
been in

the State of Utah since the happening of

th I s ecc I dent •

3.

Plelntiff filed the Complaint in question

ICJvll No. 24,751)

In the offIce of the Uteh

County Clerk on December 17, 1962 -- four years
end three days after the happening of the acddent.
4 • P I a J n t I f f f I I e d an ear I i er c omp I a i n t i n
the office of the Utah County Clerk CCJvi I No.
2•,555) on December 13, 1961.

Oefendents and appell~nts moved the court to
dismiss the complaint upon the grounds that the
four yeers Statute of Limitations had expired.
At the hearing on the argument plaintiff raised
three points which she alleges ere e complete
answer to her failure to file wl thin the period
I imJ ted by statute. These area
1. That the filing on December 17, 1962, was
2
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becuuse of en intervening weekend during
which time the office of the Utah Courly Clerk was
lege II y c I osed.
2. Thet pl8intlff filed an action erising out
of this eccident for these injuries on Jecember
13, 1961, in utah County (Civi I No. 24,555) on
which no ection was taken, but which piGintiff
claims had the effect of extending the time for
filing for one year from December 13, 1962.
3. That the absence of defendants fr~~ the
stete of utJh tolled the running of the 3tatute
of Limitetlons end, therefore, plaintiff•s action
timely

Js

time I y.

P18intiff submits th~t under point ff3 which was
relied on by the court, that the lower court
did not err in denying defendants motion to
dJs:nfss, end show this by consideration of pant

13 raised by the pltslnti ff, end this point wi II
bt treated as Point 1 of this brief.
ARGU~\\ENT

POINT 1.

THAT THE A35ENCE OF )EFENDANTS FROM THE STATE
OF UTAH TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS AND, THEr<EFORE, PLAINTIFF'S ACTION
I S T I '1\t: L Y •
~,.e

submit that the lsse reised by Defendants

and Appellants motion is controlled by Utah

:Code

Annoteted, 1953, 78-12-35, which reads as fol~ws:
3
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Effect of ebaence from state.--"lf when
e ceuae of 8ctlon accrues egelnst a
person when he Is out of the stete, the
ection mey be commenced within the term

herein limited after his return to the
stete; and 1f after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, the
time of his 8bsence is not part of the
time I im i ted for the convnencement of the
act I on. ••
Council for the defendants and appellants
atipulated l»nd admitted to the lower court thet

defendents have been residents of the state
of California ever since the cause of action
arose, end stIll are res I dents of the state of
CelifornitJ. The language of the statute, we
feel, is very expl lei t and clear when 1 t reads,
~ ••• and if, after e cause of action accrues, he
departs from the state, the time of hlsesence
the

Is not part of the time limited for the conmencement of the action."

iJe

submit there is no

•blgulty in the wording of the statuteJ the law
limply says that if the defendents after the
cause of action arose depart from the stete, the
time that he is absent doesrot

limit the

conmencement of the act ion.
The da&ndents in

answer

to

the above section

of the statute contends thet due to the fact

the Sacret~ry of State could be served so
os to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants and
thot

appellants, thet the statute on absence of the
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defendants from the stete hea no applic.Jtion.

Rt8dlng of the Non-resident Motorist Vehicle
Act, Uteh Code Annoteted, 1953, 41-12-8, shows
no reference whatsoever to the Utah stetute on
the af feet of absence from the stete.
If it was
the Intent of the JegJslature to cut down the

1eenlng

~nd

effect of the statute dearing with
absence from the state, they would have, we
aubnft, stated In the Non-resident Motorist Vehi c I e act.

In the case of Keith O'Brien Company vs.
Snyder, 51 u. 227, 160 P. 954, the Utah Sup~eme
Court had before It the Utah statute wording
exectly es set forth Jn Section 78-12-35, Utah
:ode Annotated 1953. The court found that the
~efendant

deprted from the state end was absent

therefrom for e period In excess of

5t

years.

It wes contended that an action could have been
:oomenced

~g8inst

the

defendant at any time by

aerving process on defendant's wife at the femi ly
·esidence or place of abode.

The Third Judicial Disrict Court in and for
aalt lake County, State of Utah,

found that the

•ction was not barred by the Statute of LimJ ...
'8tions, and that the pleintlff was entitled to

luagmen t •

The Supreme Court after rev lew of

'he 8uthor it ies of the meaning of the statute

·elative to absence from the state said:

5
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"It Is not necessary to further review,
or Quote from, the ceses; it must suffice

thet the greet, the overwhelming weight
of outhorlty, under statutes like ours,
le Jn support of the decision of the
District Court."
The court pointed this out in connection with
Interpreting statutes the fundamental rule when
It

The Court in conclusion saidz
t•tndeed, the authorities that hold that
ebsence from the state tolls the statute,
all 8gree thet the statute runs only during
the time the debtor is openJ.y in the state
end Immediately on his leaving it the

stetute again ceases to run unti I his
return, and that in computing time all
the periods of absence must be considered
8nd edded together.
In view of the foregoing but one conclusion Is permissible, whJch is, thet the
Judgment of the district court is right,
end should be affirmed. Such is the order."
Defendants end appel I ants contend that the
'Brien case having been decidedp--lor to the
on-resident Motorist Vehicle :\ct is In effect
oided by the passage of the Non~resident
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Motorist Vehicle Act. There Is not e utah
Supreme Court decision which supports defendants
end appellents contention. There Is e late
utah Supreme Court decision which indicates
aupport of the decision of the Keith O'Brien

case.
This Is the case of Peutmina Nick Seely~
AdminJstr~trlx of the Estete of Jacobsen
E. ~eely, ?l8lntlff and Appellant, vs.
Amellft c. Cowley, Administratrix of the
Estete of James H. Cowley, eka James He I I
Cowley and James Cowley, Defendant end
Respondent, decided October 9, 1961, 365
P8clffc Reporter, 2nd, page 63.
The Supr~e Court held that absence from the
1t ~ t e o f t h e mot or I s t • s a dm Jn i s t r a t r J x t o I I e d
the running of the two yeer statute of I Jml~etlons for wrongful

deeth.

The appellant

:ontended that the court erred Jn applying thls
•rovlslon In the statute of I imitations beca~se
he defendant elmost Immediately efter, the
'cminlstrctrfx absented herself from the state
·f Utah, 8nd had been out of the state ever

lnce, end that therefore the court should have
pplled the provisions of Section 78-12~35,

Annoteted 1953,the statute on effect
f 8bsence from the state, the same identical
tatute which is involved In our case.
'''-L~v i ng de term I ned thet our statute of
tlmJtetJon on wrongful death is not a
tah Code

llmitetion on liability, the question

rem8Jns as to whether the provisions of
Section 78-12-35 epply to a duly appointed
personal represent~tive of an estate.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The problem where ~ personal rapresen~
tet1ve who can be SU@d h88 been appointed
Is different from that in which no re~
resentetive has been appointed. In the
letter 1nst~nce our probete code gives a
creditor

right to epply for letws of
bdrrinlstratJo.-) if those who have preference

do n0t

8

~pply

et Ieese within three months.

In the case of

d

ptrSon~t

representative

who h1s been appointed absenting himself
from tht state there is no ebsolute remedy
tJ which J creditor Is entitled. Absence
from the stete is not among the grounds
listed for revocation of letters of ad~inls
tretion under the provisions of Section
73-~-1, Ut~h Code Annotated, 1953, although
it might be a reason deemed sufficient by
a 'ourt and thus be e ground for removal
under the authority of that section.
Nevertheless, whether such a reason would
be deemed sufficient by e court would depend
Jpon the discretion of that court. Although
1 c~)urt's discretion cannot be arbitr :1ri ty
used, It could wei I be before that deter1

mination was :netde the two years woutd have
elepsed ~nd a person who had a good cause
of ection would thus be deprived of his
rights unless the ebsence of the persJndl

reoresentative of the estate of the wrongdoer
tolled the stetute just as It does Jf the .
wrJn~doer himself is alive and Is absent
frJm the state. For this reason we ere of
the opinion that Section 78-12-35 ~tahCode
A,not~ted 1953, applied to a personal represe~tative of an estate who absents hl~seff
fro-n the state end .therefore the court erred
;~ granting the dismissal of the action on
the ground th~t the action hed not been
Jr·1'Jght within tv1o yeers ·as provided ·In
Secti:Jn 78-12-35, Utah Code "nnotated, 1953.
Reversed, Costs to appel lent.~
8
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we observe thet the court had before it the
uestlon of absence of the defendent from the
tete end s~ld nothing by way of overul ing the
'Brlen case. Also, thet e new adminlstretor
ould h~ve been eppinted, but th?.Jt the defendant

eppointed was absent from the state, end
,, ttbsence, the ccart held, tolled the running
f the stetute.
The Supreme Courts of Alabama, I tllnols,

~o w~s

'diene, low8, andWashJngton, cited in 119 ALR

1ge 333, t eke the vIew t h:~·~ t the stet u t e simi I .3r
, the Uteh statute Is unequlvocel In compre~ns1ve

terms, and provides for the suspension
thout regard to the character of the action es
'personam, In rem, or quesl ;n rem, and that
the leglsleture hed intended that proceedings
rem which may be substituted for remedies in
rsonam (such es ettechmentl, should be excluded
om the operation of the suspension provision,
e statute would have so provided, end that an
ceptlon to that provision may not be made by
~llcetion.
The ALR Annotated points out that
Is argument is adopted by the greater weight of
thorlty. Cases from some twenty~seven states
I listed in support of the view that the running
the stetute wes tolled during the defendant's
sence from the stete.
In Bode vs. Flynn et et_ a Wisconsin case,
9
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2~2

NWR, pege 284, the court held that en action
for damages brought more than six years Jfter
~curence of col llsion against non-resident
d~fendant wes not berred by I imitations, even
though plaintiff could heve served process upon
5tcret:~ry of State ss permitted by statute.
Th1s cese fs elmost
fer as the p.~Jnts of

identical with our case in so
lew rttlsed by the defendant

!reconcerned, ttnd represents the majority o~nJon.
·• submit that this case sets forth the correct
lne of re 5oning.
The court said the following in 252 N~'\R,

·•g• 285:
"The appel Ients clai~ that section 35.05
(3), Stats., which makes the secretary of
state the attorney of e non-resident upon
whom su~mons and c~nplclnt may be servea in
ection growing out of his use of an automobile on the highways of the state, takes
the defendants out of section 330.30, Stats._
which is to the general effect that, when
e person Is out of the state when a cause
~f action accrues against him. the statute
of limitation does not commence to run
unti I he comes Into or removes to the state,
~nd le~ves the I imit~tion statute applicable
Jn his fevor. The argument is that the
purpose of the I imitation statute is to give

the cl8iment slx yeers in which to bring
this suit; end the purpose of exempting
the period of ubaence from the stete is to
give the claimant the full period fro,n the

time he mey commence his suit; Bnd these
purposes Bre fully effected by the statutory
provision for cYrrnencing suit by service of
process upon the secretary of state. The
10
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respondent clefms that the decision of this
court in Stete v. N8tionel Accident Society
of N.Y., 103 Wis. 208, 79 N.W. 220, 223,
rules the point aq~inst the appel I ants.
The case reiJ£d on by respondent was
decided in 1899. The ~ction wes brought
by the st~te against e foreign insurance
corpor~tion after it hod withdrawn from
the stete to recover the I icense fees for
previous yeers during which it had been
lice:1sed to do business therein. ~hen the
action WdS begu~ more then six years had
efapsed since the first fee involved was
~hen

the cause of action for this
license fee accrued, the statutes of l imit8tion were es contained In ~.s. 1878. The
section of those statutes applying to actions
to recover for injuries to persons and
property, and the statutes applying to
persons without the state when the cause of
action 8Ccrued, so far ~s here meterial,
except in pa~tlculers later mentioned, were
the same ~s the present statutes. Section
4222, subd. 5, Rev. st. 1878, section
330.19 (5) Stats. 1931; section 4231, Rev.
~t. 187J, section 330.30, Stats. 1931.
The

pay1ble.

18 t t er statutes JT ov l de that :
• I f , when the
cause of action shal I accrue against any
person he shall be out of this state, such

action may be commenced within the terms
herein respectively I imlted after such
person shal I return to or remove to this
stete.• During the period wherein the
license fees sued for were pay8bte, sec.
1g15 subd. 2, Stats. 1898, made the insurance
comm;ssloner do business Jn the stae upon
whom legal process might be served. The
court stated that it was "not unmindful of
the •

* •

doctrine, that 'Nhen a corporation,

pursu8nt to a statutory requirement, •naintains
on attorney in the state upon whom process
c~n

be served* • • it is a resident of the
11
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et I the purposes of llt~tlon an~
therefore ent it I ed to the benefIt of e)(empt I\..
(generel I i ni tat I on) st..;tutes." But the
court held that, notwlthst8nding the fact

state for

th~t

the stete might h:1ve commenced en

adion egelnst the insurance company by

serving e summons upon the insurance commIssioner et any time durin~ the period involved, the statute of limitation did not
opply in its fevor, because, "by section
4231, Rev. St. (IJ78), it is excluded from
t he bene f i t s o f ex emp t 1on ( genera I t I1n i t e t 1on )
sttJtutes.~•
It wt~s considered that the case

of Tr0veters• Ins. :o. v. Fricke, 99 Wis,
3~7,

74 N.·N. 372. 78 N.W. 407, 41

L.;~.A.

557, determined thet the statute of I iml~
t et I on did not app I y in favor of foreign
corpor~lon, elthough the statute as to
service upon them was as above stated. The
court says thet, if this were not otherwise
correct, the 1897 amendment of the 1873
st8tute, not contained in the statute when
the Trevelers• Ins. Co. Case, supra, was
decided, made Jt so. This amendment provided that the provision that action& might
be brought 3Qainst nonresidents "returning
to or removing to" the state, within the
stBtutory period after their return or
removal, sho..Jid not apply to foreign corporation maintaining a manufacturing plant
In the state which hed appointed a resident
of the state upon whom process might be
served. The argument in this resoeet was
that the special e~lusion of one class of
corporations from operet ion of the statute
lndiceted a legislative Intent that no other
cl~ss of corporations should be excluded.
The •~ne re~soning would leave nonresident
natural persons within section 330.30, even
If they hed, as now, by virtue of section
85.05 (3) 1 e person within the state upon
whom service of summons and compleint might
12
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be

~ade,

end thus make the present ectlon

melntaJneble.
To construe the statute es appel Janta
co, t end we r;1 :J s t , e s s t e t e d , i n S t de v •
N8tional Accident Society, supra, read into
Section 330.~0 words thet ~re not there.
The stetute says:
"If when c person is out
of the state when the cause of ect ion accrues·~'
the s t ;' t u t e s h a I I no t r u n u n t i I he s h a t I
"return to or remove to" the stete. The
defendants, except Jensen, were out of the
state when the Cduse of action against
the~, 1ccrued.
They have not removed to or
returned to the st~te since. As to Jensen,
president of the defendant labor union, he
wes In the st~te when the action accrued,
but he immediately left the state and has
not "returned to or removed t 0 11 the s t de
since. The Leglsl8ture could, had it seen
fit, heve amended the statute as it did to
corporations owning manufacturing plant&,
etc., so

~s

to cover all

~rsons

and ell

other corporations when a person representing then resided in the state upon whom
service might be procured, but it has never
done so. This leaves nonresident natural
persons dS well as nonresident corporation
not excepted by the 1897 amendment (chapter

3)4), not entitled to the benefit of the
s t ~ t u t e o f l i m i t e t i on, a t though t h e y have
designed residents of the state as their
attorneys upon whom process may be served. ~•
In the CJse Staten vs. Weiss, 308 Pacific 2nd,
age 1021, a case before the Supreme Court of
daho on dete of March 14, 1957, the Supreme
ourt hed before it the question 8lmost exactly
ike out present case. The question presented
~s whether the provisions of the statute of
imi t.::t ion had bee~' to I I ed by an Idaho statute
13
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wh I c h a t e t e s a a f o I I ows :

"If, when the cause of action accrues against
e person, he Js out of the state, the ection
may be commenced within the term herein
limited, efter his return to the stote, end
If, efter the ceuse of ~ction accrues, he
deperts from the state, the time of hJs
ebsence is not part of the time limited
for the comnencement of the action."
It Js to be noted thut this statute is exactly
the Sdme workino es the ~Jteh stetute set forth
under Section 70-12-"35, u.c.A. 1953, except for
ere word, "when", et the end of the first creuse
of the Uteh stetute. The Utnh statute stetes,
~

••• eg~lnst e person when he is out of the state".

we respect fu II y submit that the word "when•' makes

no difference In the inee.nlng of the two statutes.

The Defend~nt In the Idaho case contended
that summons could have been served upon him et
eny time efter the cause of action ~ccrued by
serving the Secretary of State as the nonresident's attorney, 8nd that therefore, the tolling
stetute was not applicable to the situation,
and th,,t therefore, the two yeer statute eppl ied
]nd the ect ion was b8rred. The Idaho Supreme
:our t s e i d as f o I I ows :

"Other courts of last resort have held
that a statute which tolls the running of
the statute of 1 imitations when a defendant
is out of the state when the cause of
ection accrues, or departs from the state
thereafter, wil 1 be given effect even
though service could have been obtained on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1 ..

an 8gent within the state during his

ebsence, for exemple, ~ non-resident
for Injuries lnfl lcted while
using the hlghwftys of the stete. ~ome
decisions teking the view that such possible service on the Secretary of State of
other designeted involunt~ry agent is
lmm~terlel end the statute stops running
during the period of absence from the
st~, notwithstanding the motor vehicle
statute, ·:ec. 49-1101 and Sec. 49-1202,
1• C., or s J mi I 8r I eg; s let ion are a
Gotheiner v. Lenihen, 20 N.J. Misc. I 19,
25 A. 2d 430; Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis.
509, 252 N.w. 284, 94 A.L.R. 480; Couts v.
Rose, 152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E. 2d 139;
MdJUJre v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, 253
App. Div. 249, I N.Y.S. 2d 749, affirmed
27 8 N• Y • 57 6, I 6 N • E • 2 d I I 0 J N, a c r i V •

~otor1st

Flcherty,

o.c.,

115 F. Supp. 739.

In Anthes v. Anthes, 21 Idaho 305,
121 P. 553, suit was brought on a promissory note which would have been barred
by th@ provisions of whet Is now Sec.
5- 229, I.e. At that time service of
surrmons -.Jnd co,1lpl8lnt could be made "by
leaving 8 copy thereof and e copy of the
complaint in the cause at the usual piece

of ebode of the defendant with 8 member of
the femily over the age of twenty-one
years.~•

Laws 1907, 0. 321.

~hile

the defendant Jn that case was a
resident, he was absent from the state
continuously for a period of time sufficient
to to I I the stat :J t e of I i m i t utI on s. This
Court held that the statute which provided
e method of service of process upon a

resident of the state, tempor~rily absent
from hjs residence or from the state, did
not 8mend ~ec. 5.229, I.C. Cthe tot ling
s t ~t u te) ~nd the t the s tot u t e of I fm it at ions
ceased to run during the period of absence.
15
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The s8me principle is ennounced in Keith
O"~rien

··:o, v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P.
That Court held thatJ "* • * if, when

954.
the ~ause of ection accrues ag~inst a person,
he is uut of the state, the ection mey be
cormenced within the term llrnited after his
retJr-n t·) the stete, and if, after the cause
of :;·:t J '1il :iccrues, he dep.~rts from the state,
the time ~~ his absence is not part of the
time I imi ted for the corrmencement of the
ectlon, applies though the debtor has a
place of ebode or residence within the
state so that process mi3ht have been
served notolthstending his absence.'•
See also Buel I v. Duchesne Mercantile
~o.,

64 Utah 3Y1

1

231 P,

i23.

In Roberts v. Hudson, 49 Idaho 132,
2~6 P. 354, this court held that the
s t a t u t e o f I i m i t a t i on s r u n s i n f av or of
the debtor only while he is actually in
the st8te end IS tolled as soon as he
leaves the state.
~eny states h~ve passed statutes similar
to 3ecs. 49-1201 and 49.1202, I.C. which In
subst~nce provide that non-resident owners,
operetors of, or persons riding in motor
vehicles ere granted the privilege ofusing
the roads, highways and streets of this
state and thQt by so doing auch operator, or
other persons therein enumerated shal I be
deemed the equivalent to en appointment by
such non .. resident of the Secretary of ~)tate
of the st,te of Idaho, to be hi& true and
lawful ettorney, upon wh~~ may 0e served
<Jil lawful s~.J'mlonses and processes a~ainst
~i~ growing out of any accident or ltabi lity
in which seid non-resident •n-:ty be involved

while opereting, causing, or permitting
the operation of a motor vehicle upon such
hishweys.
11) Under the statute, Sec. 49~1202, 1.
c., the eppointment of the Secretary of
16
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3t~te

as such motorist's attorney is an
J nvo I Jn t er y, I rrevocdb t e one.
i·{.Jr, is bare

service 'ln the Secretary of Sttfe sufficie·nt

court to ecqufre jurisdiction of
the controversy. The statute further
provides:
"* • * such service sht!ll be
for the

sufficient end valid personel service upon

non-residentJ provided, notice of
such service 6nd a~py of the process is
forthwith sent by registered mail by the
plaintiff to the defendant, and the defen.
dent's return receipt ~nd plaintiff's
ef f i dev It of comp I i ence· herewith are
appended to the process 8nd entered es a
part of the return thereof; provided
further, that personel service outside of

seJd

the stt.ste in accordance.with the provisions
of the stetutes of ldeho relating to personal

aervice of summons outside of the state
1 he I I r e I I e v e a p I ;) i n t i f f f r om rn o i I i n g
copies of the summons or process by reg;s~
tared mei I as hereinbefore provided.
Service of said process upon a defendent
shell not be complete until the same is
either made by registered mai I or by
person., I service outside of the 3 t0te. ~;
It thusly appears that in case of service
of summons Gnd complaint on the Secretery
of State as the involuntary Bgent of o
non-resident motorist is Incomplete unless
the same Is sent by registered mai I to the
defendBnt and defendant's return receipt
secured, or in lieu thereof, personal
service made outside the state of such
sum11ons and ccmplaint. The provision for
obt~ining such service c ntains no specific
exception to the provisions tolling the
stetute oi 1 irni tat ion, :..ec. 5-229. l.C.

Nor C8n we read such en exception into the
motor vehicle act. The statutes for
Interpretation are not in irreconciable
con f 1 i ct.
17
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(2) We ere therefore constrained to
hold th~t where ~ st~tute to I Is the running
of the statute of llmit8tlons when the
defer.dt·nt Is out of the state when the
cause of ·:ction eccrues, or dep,Jrts from

the state thereafter wi I I be given effect
even though service could have been
obtelned nn .":Jn involuntary egent, in this
cese the Secretary of st~te, during his
abaence."
CONCL US I 0~~

1.

Under the provision O·f Section 78-12-35,.

lfeh Code Annoteted 1953,

the absence of the

efendants from the state of utah tolled the
unnln·J of the statute of llmi tat ions, and,
herefore, the judgment of the lower court sho~d
e affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Hugh Vern 'nentz
A t t or n e y f or P l e i n t i f f

and Respondent.
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